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The Story of Hurricane Katrina and Memorial Hospital 
In the early morning hours of August 29, 2005 the Gulf Coast braced for disaster.
1
  A 
category 3 hurricane named Katrina was descending upon Louisiana. Hurricane Katrina 
produced damaging winds up to 140 mph; 10-16 inches of rain water and storm surges up to 14 
feet.
2
 New Orleans, Louisiana, a city surrounded by water and below sea level, felt the greatest 
effects of the storm.
3
 The city, which was already in peril, was seriously damaged when fifty-
three levees breached, sending floodwaters indiscriminately throughout the city.
4
 By the time the 
storm was over, 1,100 people had died in Louisiana, a majority from New Orleans.
5
 
 After the storm, national attention turned to woefully late recovery efforts initiated by the 
Federal Government.
6
 New Orleans was designated a disaster zone; completely abandoned, 
being overrun by looters freely walking the streets causing fear and chaos to those clinging for 
survival.
7
 Hospitals were overwhelmed with the surge of patients and were ill equipped to battle 
the power outages and lack of evacuation assistance.
8
 With that said, no hospital has come under 
more scrutiny then Memorial Medical Center (“Memorial”). At Memorial, decisions were made 
to shut down the hospital, triage patients based on incorrect standards and provide end of life 
                                                          
1
 Select Bipartisan Committee, U.S., Cong., H.R., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT 
BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 7 (2006). 
2
 Id. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. at 73. 
5
 Id. at 74. 
6
 Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/magazine/30doctors.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2013). 
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. 
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palliative care to not so critically ill patients.
9
 The hospital and its medical care providers faced 
life or death decisions while treating severely ill and injured patients in worsening conditions.
10
  
Following the storm, questions were raised as to why there were so many deaths at 
Memorial. After an investigation, it was speculated that the reason for the high number of 
casualties resulted from the decision to euthanize patients who could not be evacuated.
11
 The 
investigation centered upon Dr. Anna Pou (“Dr. Pou”) and Nurses Cheri Landy and Lori Budo 
who faced criminal charges for questionable decision making involving the deaths of four 
patients.
12
 
 
How It Unfolded: Katrina Makes Landfall 
The city of New Orleans’ response to Katrina began on August 28, 2005 when 
Louisiana’s then-Governor Kathleen Blanco, with the advice of President George W. Bush, 
insisted that New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin evacuate the city.
13
 The mandatory evacuation 
order, which did not include hospitals, caused the roads out of New Orleans to become congested 
with bumper to bumper traffic resulting in thirty mile delays.
14
 Worsening the situation was the 
lack of ambulatory and air lift options for city hospitals.
15
 Also of note is that Louisiana hospitals 
                                                          
9
 Id. 
10
 Id.  
11
 Id. 
12
 Gina Castellano, The Criminalization of Treating End of Life Patients with Risky Pain Medication and the Role of 
the Extreme Emergency Situation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 204 (2007). (discussing the allegations at Memorial 
Hospital). 
13
 See BIPARTISAN, supra note 1, at 63.  
14
 Bradford H. Gray & Kathy Hebert, After Katrina; Hospitals in Hurricane Katrina; Challenges Facing Custodial 
Institutions in a Disaster, 18 J. Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 283, 285-294 (2007) (discussing lessons 
learned by hospitals from Katrina).  
15
 Id. See LOUISIANA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.lhaonline.org/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). (The Louisiana 
Hospital Association was established in 1926, the Louisiana Hospital Association (LHA) is a not-for-profit 
association representing all types of hospitals and healthcare systems throughout the state.   The LHA carries 
out its mission by providing services and resources to members through advocacy, education, research, 
representation and communication. The Hospital Association provides member hospitals with a range of 
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and nursing homes are not required by the Louisiana Hospital Association to maintain a specific 
emergency response or evacuation plan.
16
 The majority of hospitals followed the established 
protocol of “sheltering in place”, based on an ideology that patients would be safer in the 
hospital rather than risking complications during evacuation.
17
 Memorial, a private, for profit 
hospital owned by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (“Tenet”) followed the lead of other area 
hospitals and “sheltered in place” rather than evacuate before the impending storm.18 When the 
storm made landfall on Monday morning, approximately 300 hundred patients and 1,500 citizens 
looking for shelter from the storm were left stranded at Memorial.
19
 Reports claimed that some 
600 workers remained at the hospital, among them Dr. Pou, who is at the center of the Memorial 
controversy. Dr. Pou was a cancer surgeon on the faculty of Louisiana State University School of 
Medicine, and was responsible for supervising residents at Memorial. To Dr. Pou’s credit she 
deiced to remain at Memorial and help those in need.
20
   
On Tuesday, August 30, 2005 Governor Blanco ordered a mandatory evacuation of New 
Orleans.
21
 By 11:00 am, several sections of the levee system in New Orleans began to breach, 
submerging 80% of the city.
22
 The storm punished Memorial, resulting in windows being 
shattered, city power failed and Memorial’s interior was transformed into a “fetid Third World 
despair” as described by Dr. Pou.23 The hospital was without electricity, running water or air 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
services including legal representation, financial services as well as being advocates for hospitals through 
their efforts in bill passages aimed at protecting the medical community). Id.  
16
 See BIPARTISAN, supra note 1, at 268. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Susan Okie, Dr. Pou and the Hurricane – Implications for Patient Care during Disasters, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1, 1-5 (2008) (discussing Dr. Pou and her actions at Memorial during Katrina). 
19
 See Gray & Hebert, supra note 14, at 290. 
20
 See Fink, supra note 6. 
21
 See BIPARTISAN, supra note 1, at 73. 
22
 Id. 
23
 See Fink, supra note 6. 
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conditioning.
24
 The temperature rose to over 110 degrees and the smell of dead bodies became 
“so rancid it would burn the back of your throat.”25 As if things could not get worse, a sewer 
grate began to overflow, sending contaminated water towards the hospital.
26
 Understanding that 
it would not take much water to disable Memorial’s main generated emergency-power, the 
remaining staff understood that they desperately needed to evacuate the remaining 180 patients 
left from the initial evacuation attempt.
27
   
Susan Mulderick, a nursing director served as the rotating “emergency-incident commander” 
for Katrina and was tasked with communicating with hospital executives and make decisions 
during the disaster situation.
28
 Although she had helped draft the emergency preparedness plan 
for Memorial, the 246 page document was of no assistance regarding a futile situation of 
complete power loss and impassible roads due to flooding.
29
 Without the chief of medicine, Dr. 
Richard Deichmann (“Dr. Diechmann”), the medical department chairmen of Memorial, along 
with Mulderick gathered a group of physicians to begin making triage decisions regarding 
evacuation and treatment of the remaining patients.
30
 The group decided that they would first 
evacuate infants in the neonatal intensive-care unit, pregnant mothers, and critically ill adult 
I.C.U patients.
31
 Dr. Deichman then initiated a strategy that was nowhere in the hospital’s 
disaster plan; he decided, with the consent of the other physicians, that Do Not Resuscitate 
(“DNR”) patients would be last because as Deichamn put it, they had the “least to lose.”32 
During the next two days, hospital workers would make the arduous trek of manually moving 
                                                          
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
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patients to the roof for evacuation.
33
 With little sleep, food or water, workers transferred patients 
through a three foot wide opening, which led to a parking garage where a truck was waiting to 
drive patients to the top of the garage.
34
 From there, workers had to manually carry the patients 
the remaining two flights of stairs where emergency helicopters waited to evacuate Memorial’s 
chosen patients.
35
 By Tuesday evening, the hospital was able to evacuate fifty-seven patients 
bringing the total of patients left to be evacuated at one hundred and twenty-three.
36
 Fifty-two of 
the remaining patients were patients of LifeCare, a hospital that leased the seventh floor of 
Memorial to operate a long-term acute care unit.  Most LifeCare patients were bedbound and not 
included in the triage decisions because Memorial was under the impression that LifeCare would 
be implementing its own evacuation plan.
37
  
By Wednesday, the auxiliary generators had shut down, the hospital temperature rose to 110 
degrees and deceased bodies filled Memorial.
38
 With little food or water, patients continued to 
fight for their lives, and Memorial could be described as a third world war zone.
39
 Outside the 
hospital, civil unrest began to take hold of New Orleans streets.
40
 This resulted in a decision by 
State Police to evacuate everyone from the hospital by 5 pm on Thursday.
41
 Police officers 
informed Memorial’s hospital staff that they would no longer stay to protect the hospital and it 
became apparent that there would no longer be any rescue attempts after this mandated curfew 
was implemented.
42
 When it seemed like all was lost, there was finally some good news when 
                                                          
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id. 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
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Tenet sent six helicopters, along with boats, to evacuate the remaining patients from Memorial.
43
 
With the curfew bearing down upon the hospital, controversial decisions were made when it was 
decided that some patients were too sick to be evacuated.
44
 Critically ill patients, triaged as “3’s”, 
were the only remaining patients left while evacuations were taking place.
45
 From reports and 
interviews with hospital workers, it was understood that Dr. Pou along with nurses Cheri Landry 
and Lori Budo began providing palliative end of life care to patients deemed too critical for 
evacuation.
46
 By Thursday’s end, the hospital was completely evacuated, the hospital workers 
were credited for their tremendous work in saving many lives but questions remained regarding 
the final hours at Memorial.
47
  
The horrible events at Memorial shined a light on a complicated situation where both 
federal and state regulations create gray areas for medical providers in emergency situations. 
This paper will examine the decision made by Dr. Pou and her nurses to provide palliative end of 
life care and Dr. Diechman’s decision to triage DNR patients to the end of the evacuation line. 
By examining the existing protocols and legal standards in the medical profession, it will become 
apparent that medical professionals nationwide need the type of immunity created by the 
Louisiana legislature after Katrina. This type of immunity is necessary in order to provide the 
best care for the most people in a disaster emergency situation. Using Katrina and Memorial as a 
guide, this paper will show the necessity of immunizing health care providers for good faith 
efforts in treatment decisions, but will shed light regarding questionable decisions made by 
health care professionals providing palliative end of life care and triage decisions at Memorial.  
Overview of the Two Issues 
                                                          
43
 See Gray & Hebert, supra note 14, at 293. 
44
 See Okie, supra note 18, at 3. 
45
 Id. 
46
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 204. 
47
 See Gray & Hebert, supra note 14, at 292. 
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What constitutes a bad faith decision regarding medical treatment in a disaster emergency 
situation? Should the judgment of that question be a judicial one, or be based on a decision 
rendered by medical experts? Lastly, how can one prove intent to kill, which constitutes 
homicide, rather than intent to ease suffering which is legal during a doctor and patient 
relationship? 
The two questions regarding bad faith decisions made at Memorial are: first, was it a bad 
faith decision made by Dr. Pou to provide palliative end of life care to patients, and second was it 
a bad faith decision for Dr. Diechmann to make triage decisions based on DNR orders. 
Answering these two questions will help shed light on the debate as to whether medical 
providers should be granted immunity for good faith decisions made in a disaster emergency 
situation. 
Hospitals have a duty to plan for scenarios like the one at Memorial where resources are 
depleted and patients are in need of care.
48
 The Joint Commission has required disaster planning 
by hospitals for over thirty years.
49
 Hospitals must comply with comprehensive standards for 
emergency situation management to become accredited with the Joint Commission.
50
 The 
standard requires organizations to identify potential emergencies that could affect them, and to 
develop a plan that addresses the four phases of emergency management activities. These four 
phases are; mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.
51
 The Joint Commission makes it 
clear that mitigation and preparedness are extremely important in order for hospitals to come out 
of these emergency disaster situations.
52
 Although federal mandates and the Joint Commission 
                                                          
48
 Improving America’s Hospitals; The Joint Commission’s Annual Report on Quality and Safety, The Joint 
Commission, http://www.jointcommission.org/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2013). 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
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require certain protocols be implemented, it is up to the local hospitals to create their own 
Emergency Operation Plan.
53
 Although mandated by the Joint Commission to have an 
Emergency Operations Plan, the Louisiana Hospital Association did not provide any guidance in 
developing emergency response or evacuation plans prior to Katrina.
54
 According to hospital 
employees at Memorial, the emergency response plan instituted at the hospital provided no 
guidance for a disaster of such magnitude and the decision made by most hospitals was to 
“shelter in place.”55 Without a specific guide during Katrina, it was up to hospital employees to 
make their own decisions regarding evacuation and treatment.
56
 As to what constitutes a bad 
faith decision in a disaster emergency situation like Katrina is still open for debate.  
Problem 1: Was Palliative End of Life Care Improperly Administered? 
Whether Memorial’s medical providers should be immunized from liability depends upon 
whether they euthanized their patients or rendered palliative end of life care. Palliative care is 
specialized medical treatment provided to a serious ill patient with a goal of easing pain and 
improving the patient’s quality of life.57 It is defined by the Word Health Organization as care 
that “improves the quality of life for patients and families who face life threatening illness, by 
providing pain and symptom relief, spiritual and psychological support from diagnosis to the end 
of life and bereavement.
58
 During non-emergent situations, protocol for palliative sedation is 
administered based on factors involving assessments with family members and doctors.
59
 During 
Katrina, medical providers were restrained by the storm and unable to follow the proper 
                                                          
53
 Id. 
54
 Richard Moore, Prepare to Defend more Medical and Nursing Facilities; Planning for Catastrophic 
Emergencies, 50 No. 6, DRI, The Voice of the Defense Bar 1, 1-4 (2008) (discussing liability during catastrophic 
emergencies). 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 208. 
58
 George P. Smith II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care: Releasing an Unbearable 
Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J.L. &PUB. POL’Y 469, 473-474 (2010-11) (discussing end of life care).  
59
 Id. at 497. 
Vincent Sweeney 
 
9 
 
protocols to provide palliative end of life care. Medical providers were forced to make decisions 
regarding palliative care based on their own ethical determinations since Memorial’s emergency 
response plan once again offered no guidance.
60
  
Opposite of palliative end of life care is euthanasia. Euthanasia is the administration of a 
lethal agent to a patient by another person to relieve the patients “intolerable and incurable 
suffering.”61 Euthanasia is illegal in the United States as it involves the intent to kill, but some 
states have begun allowing physician assisted suicide.
62
 The legal problem arises from the 
differentiation of voluntary euthanasia and providing palliative end of life care with terminal 
sedation through pain medication.
63
 Legally, health-care providers are allowed to treat pain with 
medication even when that medication possesses a risk of hastening a patient’s death.64 The main 
issue surrounding terminal sedation and palliative end of life care with pain medication revolves 
around whether or not the “intent of the physician should be the standard for criminalization.”65 
If the intent of the physician is to euthanize a patient, then that physician is liable for murder.
66
 
Whereas if a physician provides palliative care to a seriously ill patient, intending to ease the 
patients suffering and hasten the death of a foregone patient with pain medication, then that 
physician should be absolved from all liability.
67
   
 Historically, medical treatments provided to patients without their express consent were 
considered battery. Battery at common law is defined as an intentional unpermitted act causing 
harmful or offensive contact with the "person" of another.68 Legal standards of care may be 
                                                          
60
 See Okie, supra note 18, at 3-4. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 The Free Dictionary, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/battery (last visited Dec. 4, 2013). 
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defined as the minimum amount of care and skill a health care practitioner should exercise in 
particular circumstances.
69
 In other cases, courts have found medical practitioners liable for their 
actions even though, based on the circumstances; their acts were consistent with the prevailing 
medical standards of care.
70
 In most cases courts have taken the view that a doctor extending 
treatment beyond that expressly contemplated by the patient may be held liable for a battery 
unless he acts with the patients express or implied consent.
71
 Express consent is consent that is 
directly authorized by the patient, whereas the more complex situation involves implied consent 
in emergency situations.
72
 The general rule involving implied consent is that in emergency 
disaster situation in which immediate action is necessary for the protection of life, and it is 
impracticable to obtain actual consent; implied consent is asserted during those unanticipated 
emergency conditions threatening the patient’s life.73 In these emergency situations it is the 
physician’s duty to do what the occasion demands within the “usual and customary” practice 
standards among physicians and surgeons in the locality.
74
  
                                                          
69
 Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977). 
70
 Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). Physician was found negligent for not performing certain tests on his 
patient. The court found that even though the test wasn’t part of the “standards of profession” that it was relatively 
inexpensive and safe. The court held, that the “precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma to 
patients under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the 
ophthalmology profession, it is duty of the courts to say what is required to protect patients under 40 from the 
damaging results of glaucoma. Id.at pinpoint 
Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir 1972). Plaintiff consented to back surgery and the defendant (surgeon) 
did not tell him about the dangers and risk of the surgery. The surgery resulted in paralysis. Plaintiff claims he was 
not given all the details and would not have consented if he knew all the facts. The holding imposes duty on 
physician to inform patients of all risks associated with surgery as well as places a standard that physicians can only 
perform medical procedures that were consented to by the patients with the only exceptions being in emergency 
situations. Id. at pinpoint 
71
 W.E. Shipley, Liability of physician or surgeon for extending operation or treatment beyond that expressly 
authorized, A.L.R.2d 695, 696 (1957). 
72
 Id. 
73
 Restatement (First) of Torts § 62 (1934)., (provides that an invasion of an interest of personality of another who 
has not consented thereto does not give rise to liability if … (2) an emergency has arisen which makes it actually or 
apparently necessary to invade the interest before there is an opportunity to obtain consent.). 
74
 Id. 
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After the waters receded and New Orleans began to understand the destruction, criminal 
liability was rumored to be descending upon Dr. Pou, and nurses Landry and Budo.
75
 The arrest 
affidavit released by Louisiana’s Attorney General Charles C. Foti alleged that Dr. Pou 
committed second-degree murder “on or about September 1, 2005, by intentionally killing 
multiple patients by administering or causing to be administered, lethal doses of morphine and/or 
midazolam at Memorial Medical Center.”76 The affidavit ended with the findings of the forensic 
pathologist who “advised that in all four cases it appeared that a lethal amount of morphine was 
administered.”77 The affidavit further alleged that none of the four patients were being 
administered morphine or midazolam for their routine pharmaceutical care requirements.
78
 
Adding to the troubling findings in the affidavit is the claim that the four patients receiving pain 
medication were conscious and aware of the situation around them.
79
 According to sources, 
consent was not given to Dr. Pou or the nurses working with her, but rather it seems that Dr. Pou 
and the medical professionals at Memorial decided that palliative end of life care was their 
decision to make when further evacuation of these patients seemed improbable.
80
  
Dr. Pou has vehemently defended herself stating that “she did not murder those patients nor 
does she believe in euthanasia.
81
 She furthered stated that she doesn’t believe it’s anyone’s right 
to decide when a patient dies, but that she believes in comfort care, and that means ensuring that 
patients do not suffer pain.
82
 With that said, four deaths were explicably tied to a high level of 
morphine and midazolam, and the question remains, did Dr. Pou and her two nurses effectively 
                                                          
75
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 204. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id.  
79
 See Fink, supra note 6. 
80
 Id. 
81
 See Okie, supra note 18, at 1. 
82
 Id. 
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euthanize these patients or should they be immune from liability because they acted ethically in 
providing palliative end of life care with pain medication.
83
 
A theory that the law might look to for guidance in dire emergency situations like Katrina 
and Memorial is the doctrine of double effect.
84
 The doctrine clearly hypothesizes that “taking 
the life of another is always morally impermissible, yet when this results from actions carrying 
foreseeable but unintended harm, it may be permissible when the action is itself a moral act 
producing proportionate good.
85
 The principle is laid out as four elements: first that the agent 
only intends to bring about good, that foreseeable harms are unintended and not a means to that 
good, that the intended means is morally permissible and that the intended good is proportionate 
to the unintended harm.
86
 Double effect theorizes that an actor with good intentions is not 
responsible for the unintended bad effects.
87
 In Dr. Pou’s case, using the theory, “as long as she 
intended to ease the pain of her patients and not cause death, even though death resulted, she is 
not culpable.”88 Dr. Pou has adamantly denied euthanizing the patients in question and has stated 
that she believes in comfort care, by providing her patients with legally permissible pain 
medication to ease suffering.
89
 But the question remains, how does one prove Dr. Pou’s intent? 
The answer can really only be determined by Dr. Pou herself. While others in the hospital can 
theorize what she may have been thinking, a medical professional’s decision to provide a patient 
                                                          
83
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 204. 
84
 See Smith II, supra note 56, at 500-01. 
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997)., and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S.Ct. 
2293 (1997). Supreme Court justices with the majority holding that the principal of double effect is recognized 
within American jurisprudence and should be employed when determining culpability of a physician in regard to his 
or her patient’s death if caused by terminal sedation or pain treatment. Id.  
85
 Id. 
86
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 220-24. 
87
 Id. at 206. 
88
 Id. 
89
 See Okie, supra note 18, at 1. 
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with palliative end of life care cannot be second guessed because the downside of this result 
would be patient suffering and medical professionals waiting for their inevitable death. 
Medical professionals are not allowed to effectively euthanize patients while claiming the 
deaths were merely unintended effects of end of life care.
90
 Health care providers are legally 
allowed to treat pain with pain medication even if that medication poses a risk of hastening a 
patient’s death.91 In administering pain medication, physicians must follow criteria that states: 
any risky pain relief is necessary, the pain is intractable, that less dangerous but effective 
analgesics do not exist, and that the dosage be titrated upward in a careful fashion.
92
 While 
treating these patients, it is unquestionably acceptable to provide medication that may hasten 
death when the intent of the health care provider is to relieve pain.
93
 The dilemma remains in a 
disaster emergency situation where medical providers may act because a patient is suffering 
extreme pain and to relieve this pain the medical provider is unable to follow the proper 
protocol.
94
  
The majority of the medical community has stated that aggressive pain treatment is necessary 
and expected to be provided by medical professionals.
95
 Supreme Court Justice John Paul 
Stevens’ concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg, stated that a physician’s refusal to 
dispense medication to ease the suffering of their patient and make their death dignified and 
tolerable would be inconsistent with the physicians healing role.
96
 Furthermore, medical 
commentators have said that it would be medical malpractice for physicians caring for severely 
ill patients not to know how to use pain medicine, and not to use it aggressively when a patient is 
                                                          
90
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 208. 
91
 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
92
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 212. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. at 214-16. 
96
 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 748 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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dying in pain.
97
 To clarify the point, the President’s Commission Report for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medical and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, issued during the Ronald Reagan 
presidency, defers to the medical judgment of doctors, holding that physicians are not held to 
have violated the law when using potent pain treatment because society places an “importance on 
defining physicians’ responsibilities regarding these choices and on developing an accepted and 
well-regulated social role that allows the choice to be made with due care.
98
 The report further 
stated that if the patient is terminal and there is no further treatment that can extend the patient’s 
life, then it’s difficult to see how the physician deprives the patient of meaningful life by the 
treatment, rather it is the disease that deprives the patient of life.
99
  
The medical provider’s intent in disaster emergency scenarios is nearly impossible to 
determine, but for the betterment of society it is imperative that these medical professionals be 
free to provide the care they believe is in their patient’s best interest. The medical profession 
clearly believes that it is necessary for medical professionals to provide palliative end of life to 
patients who are seriously ill and suffering end of life pain. The unanswered question is whether 
or not Dr. Pou and her colleagues were in fact practicing palliative end of life care and was it 
properly administered.  
Problem 2: Were DNR Patients Incorrectly Triaged? 
The aftermath of Katrina raised a second issue: whether or not medical providers at 
Memorial acted in good faith by triaging patients with DNR orders to the end of the evacuation 
line. DNR orders are medical instructions written by a patient that instructs health care providers 
not to do cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) if breathing stops or if the heart stops 
                                                          
97
 See Castellano, supra note 12, at 214-16. 
98
 President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatments: Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 79 
(1983). 
99
 Id. 
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functioning.
100
 The order allows a patient the opportunity to choose to decline resuscitative 
treatment before an emergency occurs.
101
 Signing a DNR order does not affect other treatments 
but rather focuses solely on CPR if breathing stops or the heart stops beating.
102
   
Triage historically evolved in the military context, and the idea of saving the most in need 
was replaced by the “greatest good for the greatest number rule.”103 Current triage models are 
based on “sorting patients for treatment in situations of at least modest resource scarcity, 
according to an assessment of the patient’s medical condition and the application of an 
established sorting system or plan.”104 The United States uses a system scaling patients between 
one and five, with one begin the most acutely ill patients and five being the expectant death 
patients.
105
 In disaster mass casualty situations like Katrina, the World Medical Association has 
recommended that clinicians categorize disaster victims with a system that has been adopted 
worldwide involving the following triage criteria:  
 
1) Priority 1: Those who can be saved but whose lives are in immediate danger requiring 
treatment within a few; 
2) Priority 2: Those whose lives are not in immediate danger but who need urgent but not 
immediate medical care; 
3) Priority 3: Those requiring only minor treatment; 
4) No Specific Tag: who are psychologically traumatized and might need reassurance or 
sedation if acutely disturbed; and 
5) Expectant (Death): Those whose condition exceeds the available therapeutic resources, 
who have severe injuries such as irradiation or burns to such an extent and degree that 
cannot be saved in the specific circumstances of time and place, or complex surgical 
cases that oblige the physician to make a choice between them and other patients.
106
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The World Medical Association states that it is “unethical for a physician to persist, at all 
costs at maintaining the life of a patient beyond hope, thereby wasting to no avail scare resources 
needed elsewhere.”107 The importance of triage decisions cannot be overlooked. In a disaster 
emergency situation it is necessary to have a plan in place to make these decisions which will 
result in the saving of the greater number of lives.
108
 Intrinsic to the decision to triage patients are 
ethical considerations as to who should live and who should die.
109
 In order to effectively triage 
patients the ethical parameters upon which decisions will be based as to who lives and who dies 
should be decided pre-emergency and be housed in existing protocol rather than decisions made 
during an emergency.
110
 Additionally different physicians may have different views about triage 
systems creating ethical and legal implications for hospital personnel in the time when aid is 
most needed.
111
 It is recommended that a triage plan be evaluated by both legal and ethical 
experts before being put into place.
112
  
 As Katrina mercilessly battered Memorial, it became apparent that evacuation would 
become problematic for even the healthiest of patients. While waiting on federal, state and local 
aid, aid that may never arrive, it became the duty of the medical providers to make the hard 
choices in order to save the most lives.
113
 The first treatment decisions made at Memorial were to 
triage patients and decide who should be evacuated first.
114
 Hospital administrators began 
contacting other local hospitals, informing them that they needed to evacuate over 180 
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patients.
115
 Although federally mandated by FEMA, there was no organized plan for this 
evacuation.
116
 Memorial did have an emergency plan but the plan did not offer guidance for 
dealing with a complete power failure or how to evacuate the hospital if the city became 
flooded.
117
  
Dr. Deichman along with the others assembled in the command center decided that 
evacuation priority would be; babies in the neonatal intensive care unit, pregnant mothers and 
critically ill adult I.C.U patients, who were at the greatest risk from the intense heat.
118
 The 
physicians also agreed that patients with DNR orders should go last because they would have 
“the least to lose” compared with other patients if tragedy struck.119 Triaging patients based on 
DNR orders was nowhere to be found in Memorial’s 246 page emergency preparedness 
documents, and this classification forced many patients to the end of the evacuation line.   
By Wednesday, August 31, 2005, President George W. Bush declared a Public Health 
Emergency for the Gulf Coast and organized a task force to control the relief effort.
120
 By 2:00 
am of that day, Memorial’s auxiliary generators had shut off sending life support monitors into 
battery mode. Physicians and nurses frantically began to move more patients to a helipad for 
evacuation. Physically exhausted from working without sleep and with no relief in sight they 
forged on without water, electricity and a first floor flooded with a “soupy ocean of sewage 
water.”121 After surviving the night, the physicians gathered in the command center to discuss the 
remaining patients at Memorial.
122
 They decided to implement a “reverse triage” plan for the 
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remaining patients at Memorial and those on the seventh floor maintained by LifeCare.
123
 A 
reverse triage scheme treats the less wounded in preferences of the more severely wounded.
124
  
 The physicians categorized the remaining 123 Memorial patients and 52 LifeCare 
patients as “1” those that were in fairly good health, could sit and walk. Patients characterized as 
“1’s” were prioritized for evacuation first.125 The next group, characterized as “2’s” sicker than 
“3’s,” were taken to a waiting area to be evacuated following the “1’s”.126 Finally, the “3’s” were 
moved to a corner in the hospital to wait for eventual, if ever, evacuation.
127
 Among the “3’s” 
were those whom physicians deemed to be very ill and those with DNR orders. The problem that 
emerged was that the characterization of “3’s” forced some patients that were ill but not dying 
stay behind while others without DNR orders were given priority evacuation status.
128
 Dr. 
Diechner’s initial decision and the reverse triage decision excluded patients with DNR orders 
from evacuation. In an interview with The New York Times, Mark LeBlanc told the story of how 
his mother was triaged as a “3” and would not be evacuated.129 His mother who had the DNR 
order for all of her admissions into the hospital, had made the decision that she did not want to be 
revived if her heart failed.
130
 She did not make the decision to not be evacuated because she had 
a DNR but because she was improperly triaged as such.
131
 LeBlanc wouldn’t take no for an 
answer when being told that his mother would not be evacuated and instead evacuated her 
himself.
132
 Another precarious incident occurred with Angela McManus who in an interview told 
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a story of how her mother was not initially evacuated because of a DNR order.
133
 The order 
which her mother had in place before entering the hospital was signed by her doctor, a doctor 
who was not at the hospital to rescind the order leaving Angela’s mother as a “3” triage level and 
unable to be evacuated.
134
 These two situations along with other patients triaged as “3’s” 
highlight the question, was it in bad faith to triage patients based on DNR orders?  
Louisiana’s Response 
Following the grand jury’s decisions to not indict Dr. Pou, Dr. Pou felt that it was necessary 
to protect her and other medical professionals if a situation like Katrina occurred again. 
Realizing that there are no comprehensive national liability protections for health care 
practitioners but rather different liability protections at both the federal and state level, Dr. Pou 
lobbied the Louisiana legislature to change this.  Through her advocacy, three laws were passed 
in Louisiana to help aid future healthcare professionals during a declared natural disaster.
135
  
The first statutory reform that the Louisiana legislature passed was Senate Bill 330 which 
amended the existing Good Samaritan statute.
136
 The statute protects a health care professional 
during a declared natural disaster regardless of whether or not they were compensated.
137
 The 
statute protects medical personnel from “simple negligence” and only allows for liability for 
“gross negligence” or “willful misconduct.”138 Senate Bill 330 aims to protect volunteers and 
those that stay and work even though they are not compensated. In the situation of Dr. Pou and 
the other employees of the hospital, she advocated, and the legislature agreed that they should 
not face liability when they stayed to help during Katrina. Although the hospital was technically 
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closed, they continued to work and attend to their patients. The legislature in implementing this 
bill understood how important it was for these medical providers to stay and provide aid and 
wanted to ensure that in future situations the same outcome would occur. 
The second statutory reform passed by the Louisiana legislature was Senate Bill 301 which 
gives “immunity for simple or gross negligence by doctors and nurses, thereby protecting them 
from civil damage as a result of the evacuation or treatment decisions (as well as failed 
evacuation or treatment) at the direction of the military or the government in accordance with 
“disaster medicine” protocols.”139 The statute recognizes that “medical personnel should not bear 
civil liability for such disastrous situations unless involved in intentional misconduct.”140 This 
statute is important to Dr. Pou and her colleagues. It is necessary that these physicians be able to 
make good faith decisions regarding the medical treatment of their patients during emergencies. 
These decisions include triaging patients based on the proper protocols approved by the hospital, 
evacuation decisions stated in the hospitals procedures manual during emergency and general 
treatment decisions by physicians during emergency situations.  
The third and final bill that Dr. Pou advocated for and the Louisiana legislature passed was 
House Bill 1379. This bill sets up a unique “Disaster Medicine Review Panel” concept to 
examine medical judgment during declared disasters.
141
 The act establishes a panel of three 
members consisting of the coroner, a member of the medical community and a disaster medicine 
expert appointed by the Governor.
142
 These three will make an independent decision based on a 
standard of care as to whether the medical decisions were “good faith medical judgment given 
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the disaster circumstances under which the judgment was rendered.”143 With regards to criminal 
liability, and important to Dr. Pou’s advocacy in light of her situation, is that the Prosecutor will 
refrain from arresting the medical personnel until the three person panel has rendered a 
determination.
144
 The bill also works as a safeguard for physicians who understand that the 
person judging their medical decision is one of their peers in the medical community.   
What’s Next? The Necessity of Immunity for Health Care Providers  
In a Future Katrina Like Situation 
 
The charges against Dr. Pou would not result in an indictment but the controversial deaths of 
patients at Memorial still begged the question of whether or not the decisions made that day were 
in good faith. Defining what constitutes good faith should be determined in a tribunal setting 
similar to the one set up in Louisiana House Bill 1379. A panel of medical experts should 
examine the complex scenarios and determine if medical professionals acted in bad faith during 
emergency disaster situations or whether medical professionals provided the proper care as 
justified by the local medical community. Similarly to a situation like Memorial, it would be up 
to the panel to determine whether Dr. Pou was acting in bad faith to euthanize the patients in 
question or rather was acting in good faith while providing end of life palliative care. 
Furthermore, it would be the panel’s responsibility to determine if the triage decisions made 
by Dr. Diechmann resulted in bad faith. Judging by the existence of historical triage protocols, it 
would be difficult to determine that triaging patients with DNR orders was a correct approach. 
Whether or not the doctors actions constituted bad faith should be determined by the panel 
created under Louisiana House Bill 1379. Understanding how difficult this determination would 
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be and the complexity of the process, it seems imperative that nationwide legislation be put into 
place for future Katrina like scenarios.   
The theory of “double effect” should act as the guide for determining what decisions are 
made in good faith and those that are made in “bad faith.” Inherently, the belief is necessary that 
medical professionals act in good faith while treating their patients. It is this inherent belief that 
allows for such things as confidentiality and on the reverse side allows for medical professionals 
to perform necessary medical procedures without fear of recourse. It is imperative for relief in an 
emergency disaster situation that there is an implied belief that medical professionals act in good 
faith while delivering aid to patients.  
Attorney General Foti’s investigation focused on twenty-five deaths, not caused by natural 
causes.
145
 The investigation narrowed in on the four deaths of Emmett Everett, Rosie Savoie, 
Ireatha Watson, and Hollis Alford.
146
 The results of the autopsy showed that none of the four 
victims were terminally ill and the forensic pathologist concluded that all four had lethal doses of 
morphine and that all four were expected to live through the storm.
147
 Concerning to the issue of 
good faith decision is the complication that the group being investigated all had DNR orders.
148
 
Further disconcerting, are the reports of many of the victims being conscious at the time of the 
terminal sedation.
149
 In the interviews conducted for the indictment, others in the hospital 
testified that all four patients were resting comfortably and none of them had complained of pain 
on the day they were injected.
150
 None of the patients were under the care of Dr. Pou or the 
                                                          
145
 Charles I. Lugosi, Natural Disasters, unnatural deaths: the killings on the life care floors at Tenet’s Memorial 
Medical Center after Hurricane Katrina, 23.1 Issues in Law & Medicine 71, 71-6 (2007) (discussing the 
controversial deaths at Memorial). 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. 
148
 See Fink, supra note 6. 
149
 Id. 
150
 Id. 
Vincent Sweeney 
 
23 
 
nurses accused of helping to inject them, and according to testimony, none of them were aware 
of the medicine they were being given.
151
  
 Dr. Pou maintains her innocence and maintains that she was providing legally permissible 
end of life palliative care. The majority of the medical community came to her support following 
her arrest. Following her statements, that she was only providing “comfort care” in a horrible 
situation, the Louisiana State Medical Society issued a press release stating that they were 
confident that Dr. Pou performed courageously under the most challenging and horrific 
conditions and that she made decisions in the best interest of the patients.
152
 They further 
commented that her long and distinguished career as a talented surgeon and dedicated educator 
should not be tarnished as a result of the accusations.
153
 Articles were written in the local 
medical community summarizing her long and dedicated career with commentary from the 
medical community describing her as compassionate and being held in the highest regard. 
154
  
The above mentioned bills are necessary to protect medical providers who risk their lives and 
careers to provide aid to those in need during an emergency disaster situation. Without federal 
legislation similar to the legislation passed in Louisiana, medical providers will be less willing to 
stay and provide aid during an emergency disaster situation. Analyzing commentary and surveys 
provided by the medical community, it is apparent that they believe it is necessary to protect 
medical providers from criminal charges in these situations. Many in the medical profession 
point out that the criminalization of Dr. Pou’s treatment decisions will have an adversely 
dangerous effect on future emergency disaster response.
155
 Commentators point out that “nobody 
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is going to want to stay in these extreme emergency situations, resulting in pain going 
untreated.”156  
Timothy Quill, director of palliative care at the University of Rochester Medical Center came 
to the defense of Dr. Pou, stating that the drugs she used were typical for palliation, not 
euthanasia.
157
 He pointed out that there were no paralytics or barbiturates used, that these drugs 
would point to a person trying to end the life of a patient.
158
 He furthered commented that the 
drug levels given to the patients were comparable to those given in palliative care and that Dr. 
Pou was just trying to do the right thing in an awful situation and was doing the best that she 
could.
159
 Although there are reports that Dr. Pou injected patients that were not terminally ill, the 
medical community believes that she was acting in good faith to care for these patients in dire 
situation. Dr. Pou was acting in good faith when she administered comfort palliative care to 
patients that Memorial believed would not survive an evacuation attempt. That belief cannot be 
questioned; medical providers will be less willing to help. The amount of victims that were saved 
during this horrific scenario by medical providers, who could have easily left, goes unnoticed.  
Finally, in 2006 the Community Health Planning and Policy Development Section of the 
APHA conducted an electronic survey of prospective volunteer health practitioners.
160
 The study 
asked potential volunteers about the importance of immunity from civil lawsuits in deciding 
whether to volunteer during emergencies.
161
 Almost 70% of participants responded that it was 
important or essential.
162
 The study asked several other questions regarding liability and whether 
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or not medical personnel would volunteer in an emergency situation.
163
 Not surprisingly, the 
survey made it clear that many participants would be reluctant to take on extended roles without 
some assurance that they would be protected from prosecution or litigation.
164
 Furthering the 
point, Cheryl Peterson, a senior policy fellow for the American Nurses Association was quoted 
as saying “if you want practitioners to continue to respond to disasters, you cannot put them in a 
position when they are making very difficult decisions where they’ll be second guessed by 
someone who is not there.”165 The survey responses along with commentary from the medical 
community point to the importance of creating a comprehensive federal bill protecting health 
care provider’s immunity from both criminal and civil liability for good faith decisions regarding 
treatment in disaster emergency situations.  
Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, physicians should be granted immunity for good faith 
decisions made in emergency disaster situation. The laws passed in Louisiana are at the forefront 
of what legislation should be in the United States. There should be federal protection for medical 
providers during emergency disaster situations in order to prevent resources from withdrawing 
their help for fear of liability. With a strong umbrella of liability protection, aid will be more 
readily provided to people that need it the most.  
 As for the situation at Memorial, the physicians, nurses and other hospital employees 
were unaware that they would ever be put in a situation like Katrina. Their hospital disaster 
response plan left them woefully unprepared. Their decision to triage patients based on their 
DNR orders was incorrect, but their goal of saving as many patients as possible, while working 
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day and night in deplorable conditions is commendable. Medical providers should not face 
criminal or civil liability for their actions in situations like Katrina. The benefits far outweigh the 
negatives in imposing liability on medical professionals at a time when they come to the aid of 
those most in need during a disaster emergency situation. 
 
 
